the reasons for the flight of 240 000 Palestinian Arabs from areas which had been allocated to the Jewish state by the November 1947 UN partition plan and another 150 000 from the Jerusalem region and areas allocated to the Arab state. Cohen was upset to read the report' s conclusion that 70 percent of these Arabs had fled due to "direct, hostile Jewish operations against Arab settlements" by Zionist militias, or the "effect of our hostile operations on nearby (Arab) settlements. I1J One month before Cohen received this report, Mapam s political committee had issued a resolution opposing "the tendency to expel the Arabs from the Jewish state " in response to Cohen s warnings that such operations were taking place.
Over the course of Arab-Jewish fighting between 1947 and 1949 well over 700 000 Palestinians were made refugees, the majority of them by direct expulsion or the fear of expulsion or massacre. The largest single expulsion occurred after Israeli conquest of the towns of Lydda and Ramla in the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv corridor during July 9-, 1948. Some 50 000 Palestinians were driven out of their homes in these towns by Israeli forces whose deputy commander was Yitzhak Rabin, prime minister of Israel from 1974-1977 and 1992-1995 . Some two dozen massacres of Palestinians were perpetrated by pre-state Zionist militias and Israeli forces, the most infamous of them on April 9-, 1948 , at the village ofDeir Yassin.
Yet after the war, it was Mapam s prescription for the conduct of Israeli forces-rather than the reality of expulsion-that became official Israeli history, and eventually, came to define the Jewish
Israeli collective memory
of what happened in 1948. For decades the state of Israel, and traditional Zionist historians, argued that the Palestinian Arabs fled on orders from Arab military commanders and governments intending to return behind the guns of victorious Arab armies which would "drive the Jews into the sea." Consequently, the Zionist authorities would admit little or no responsibility for the fate ofthe Palestinian refugees and their descendants. This was not due to lack of adequate information. Ample evidence from Zionist sources from the period of the 1948 war and immediately afterwards indicates that members of the military and political elite, secondary leaders and intellectuals close to them knew very well what happened to the Palestinian Arabs in 1948 , to say nothing of rank-and-file soldiers and kibbutz members who actually expelled Palestinians, expropriated their lands and destroyed their homes. But soon after the fighting, Zionist and Israeli state officials began to consolidate an official discourse that enabled most Israeli Jews to "forget" what they once "knew that during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war a large number of Palestinian Arabs were ethnically cleansed from the territories that became the state of Israel. Morris now provides a moral justification for ethnic cleansing that he did not offer before the second intifada, arguing that "( e 1 ven the great American democracy could not have been created without the annihilation of the Indians." Native Americans and those with a sounder knowledge of North American history may demur. But in Israel, appeal to the authority of the US is the ultimate clincher in any argument. Yearning for the success of the American example, Morris now criticizes Israel' s first prime minister and defense minister, David Ben-Gurion, for failing to do "a complete job" because "this place would be quieter and know less suffering if the matter had been resolved once and for all. If Ben-Gurion had carried out a large expulsion and cleansed the whole country. . .. It may yet turn out that this was his fatal mistake. " Palestine-Israel might also be quieter today if The focus on Jewish actions is partly, but not entirely, due to the availability of copious Israeli literary and archival materials and the paucity of comparable Arab sources. Morris ' empiricist and positivist historical method excludes Palestinian Arab voices from his narratives to nearly the same extent as the old historians and the political leadership with which they were organically connected. Explaining that he was "brought up believing in the value of documents " Morris claims to distrust oral evidence. l21 Moreover , he asserts that Is the line between military policy and political policy as sharp as Morris insists? Did Ben-Gurion participate in making this decision in his capacity as the future prime minister of Israel or in his capacity as its future minister of defense? Did he make a decision in his capacity as a military leader that he could not have made in his capacity as a political leader because he feared it would arouse opposition from Mapam and international criticism ofthe Jewish state before it was even established? If only villages which "hosted hostile local militia and irregular forces" were to be destroyed, why did the Haganah approve the Etzel/Lehi attack http://www.merip. org/mer/mer230123 0 -beinin.html That's essentiall army major rema stiletto-heeled ey don t sell beer.
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on Deir Yassin-a village that had signed and observed a peace agreement with its Jewish neighbors? (15) According to Morris ' periodization The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem he found an order from Maj. Gen. Carmel to all the division and district officers under his command to "do all you can to immediately and quickly purge the conquered territories of all hostile elements....The residents should be helped to leave the areas that have been conquered. I211 Carmel' s forces proceeded to carry out massacres in ten villages they had occupied. To his credit, Morris corrected himself and unequivocally reported , "
Carmel had not told me the truth. I221 Truth, Not Justice
The traj ectory of Morris' historical work expresses a certain radicalization in both its conclusions and their political implications that corresponded roughly to the period of the fIrst Palestinian intifada and the ensuing willingness of liberal Zionists to negotiate with Palestinians, culminating in the Oslo "peace process" of 1993-2000. Thus, even though his conceptual categories do not exceed the limits of liberal Zionist discourse, they contributed to expanding the boundaries of that discourse in a favorable conjuncture when liberal, middle-class Israeli Jews eagerly looked forward to the end of the PalestinianIsraeli conflict.
The conclusion of the Hebrew version of
The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem which appeared in 1991 , contains a harsher assessment of Israeli responsibility for the flight of the refugees than the English version of 1988. There Morris added that, in addition to Arab and Jewish fears and fighting, the refugee problem was "in part. . . the result of deliberate, not to say malevolent, actions of Jewish commanders and politicians; in smaller part Arab commanders and politicians were responsible for its creation through acts of commission and omission. (23J articles that appeared after the publication of 
All Cried Out
The bottom line of Morris ' reassessment represents the Israeli national consensus: "What happened in 1948 is irreversible. (21) That is to say, there can be no consideration of a Palestinian right to return in any form. The entire historical project of demonstrating Israel' s ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in 1948 is emptied of its obvious current political implications and reduced to an antiquarian curiosity. For Morris and the broad center of the Israeli consensus, even if they are prepared to acknowledge that it happened, to one degree or another, it is irrelevant to the political questions that can legitimately be addressed.
Benny Morris and the liberal Zionist intelligentsia of which he is (or was) a part limited a priori the conclusions that might be drawn from the historical reassessment of 1948 and related matters. Among the new historians, only Ban Pappe speaks openly in favor of recognizing the right of return of Palestinian refugees-the red line dividing those who adhere to the IsraeliJewish national consensus from those who do not. Because Morris avoided the conclusions toward which his research gestured, even in his most radical phase, most Israelis enmeshed in the traditional Zionist discourse could simply ignore his work rather than engage in a serious effort to dispute its empirical evidence. Many knew very well what had happened in 1948 and were not embarrassed by it in front of Jewish audiences, although they knew it was best to be discreet in front of non-Jews. After the initial shock, only guardians of the flame of Ben-Gurion and the heritage of labor Zionism, like Shabtai Teveth and Anita Shapira, felt the necessity to dispute Morris and the "new historians. " (281 Hence the new historians have not , as Zachary Lockman predicted (29) 
